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A MODEL OF SCHOLARSHIP
MICHAEL JACKSON, Q.C.t
It is with respect and appreciation for a great jurist that I join with my
colleagues in honouring the contributions of Ken Lysyk in the area of
Aboriginal Law and Aboriginal Rights. The first measure of the strength of
those contributions is to realize how easily the concepts of Aboriginal Law
and Aboriginal Rights roll off the legal tongue. In 2004, it is not only the legal
cognoscenti who can engage in a discussion of Aboriginal Title, Aboriginal
and Treaty Rights, the justificatory process for Federal and Provincial
governmental interference with those rights, the fiduciary obligations of the
Crown, and many other concepts that together form the basis for an important
body of law and practice. Most Canadian law schools now offer one or more
courses in this area of the law and to teach a first year property class without
reference to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Delgamuukw'
would be tantamount to studying the history of psychology without reference
to Sigmund Freud (and by this I am not drawing any parallels between the
Crown's underlying title and the psychoanalytic concept of the sub-conscious
mind, although First Nations have difficulty with both). In my first year
Criminal Law class, my students study a pivotal judgment of the Supreme
Court of Canada in the Gladue2 case, which recognizes the importance of
Aboriginal Peoples' concepts and practices of justice and its relationship to
the incorporation of restorative justice principles in the Criminal Code.3 In
2004, it would be a highly unusual docket of the Supreme Court of Canada
that did not include a number of appeals that address the issues of Aboriginal
Rights and Aboriginal Law. However, while for this generation of law
students and lawyers, it is natural to see this area of the law as an important
part of the knowledge base for the contemporary lawyer, those of us who have
been involved in this area for some time know all too well how dramatic the
changes have been in terms of legal consciousness of Aboriginal Rights.
f Michael Jackson, Q.C. is a professor at the Faculty of Law, University of British
Columbia.
I Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 66 B.C.L.R. (3d) 285
[Delgamuukw].
2 R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688, 171 D.L.R. (4th) 385.
3 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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Professor Ken Lysyk, the scholar, played a key role in bringing about these
changes.
It was in 1972 that I first proposed at U.B.C. Law School that there be a
course called 'Native People and the Law'. At that time, one hundred and five
years after Confederation, no such course was offered in any Canadian law
school. The encouragement given for this initiative is one of the many
examples of the vision of Dean Emeritus George Curtis, who encouraged
young faculty members to push the borders of legal scholarship in developing
new courses that embraced a larger vision of the role of law in promoting
progressive social change and the protection of human rights, a vision shared
by Professor Lysyk when he later assumed the deanship at U.B.C.
In 1972, when I began putting together the course materials for Canada's
first course on Native People and the Law, I started with virtually a blank slate
in terms of my own intellectual and legal training. Whatever the much vaunted
benefits of an English legal education (including arguing a moot before Lord
Denning), a knowledge of the history of Aboriginal Peoples in North America
and the dark legacy of colonialism was not among them. In assembling a set
of materials designed to educate myself as much as the students, I was struck
by several features of the literature and jurisprudence.
First, the historical and legal relationships between First Nations and the
Crown were the subject of what in 1742 the great Iroquois statesman,
Canasateego, referred to as "pen and ink work".4 There was a vast record of
treaty councils, diplomatic exchanges, royal proclamations, and colonial
ordinances that addressed issues of land rights, self-governance, and the
intersection between indigenous and colonial laws and legal systems.
Second, and a related feature of my research in assembling these materials,
was that the issues of Aboriginal Rights and the legal relationship between the
Crown and First Nations were not only the subject of diplomatic and treaty
exchanges, but were ones addressed in the highest courts. I read the seminal
decisions of Chief Justice Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1820s
and 1830s in Johnson v. M'Intosh5 and the Cherokee Nation cases culminating
in Worcester v. Georgia,6 the 1847 judgment of the New Zealand Supreme
Court in R. v. Symonds,7 and a series of Privy Council cases emanating from
Canada in the late Nineteenth Century including the St. Catherine's Milling
4Treaty with the Six Nations Indians, 4 July 1744, (Virginia, Maryland, and the Indians of
the Six Nations) reproduced in Alden T. Vaughn, ed., Early American Indian Documents, 1607-
1789, vol. 2 (Fredrick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1984) at 77.
5 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 5 L. Ed. 681 (1823).
6 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 8 L. Ed. 483 (1832).
7 [18471 N.Z.P.C.C. 387 (S.C.).
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case.8 Building upon the British Colonial practice of treaty making, I read the
history of Canadian treaty making in the post-confederation era in the so-
called numbered treaties, which according to their English text at least
surrendered Aboriginal Title in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and the
eastern part of British Columbia and the Western Arctic. That period of
historical treaty making ended in the 1920s. At that point, I discovered that the
rich historical and jurisprudential record of Aboriginal and treaty rights began
to run dry. It was as if there had been a legal eclipse of a whole body of law.
There were several causes of this legal eclipse. Most obvious was the 1927
amendment to the Indian Act 9 that was passed following an unsuccessful
attempt by the allied tribes of British Columbia to get the Federal Government
to recognize that British Columbia's refusal to acknowledge the existence of
Aboriginal Title in the Province was contrary to principles of the common law
and the provisions of the Royal Proclamation of 1763.0 The amendment made
it an offence to solicit or receive funds from any Indian for the purpose of
prosecuting an Indian claim. The amendment was premised on the proposition
that since there was no such thing as Indian title in British Columbia, Indians
should be protected from those lawyers who would erroneously and
mischievously advance a case on the basis that such a concept existed in law.
That amendment remained in force until 1951. It effectively chilled any legal
initiatives to advance the Indian land claim movement in the courts of British
Columbia until the Nisga'a initiated their historic case in the late 1960s. The
other source for the eclipse was that Canadian Indian policy became
increasingly committed to the politics and practice of assimilation, most
clearly reflected in a statement by the Deputy Superintendent General of
Indian Affairs in Ottawa, Duncan Campbell Scott, that "the happiest future for
the Indian race is absorption into the general population ... ."" He also stated
that "Our objective is to continue until there is not a single Indian in Canada
that has not been absorbed into the body politic and there is no Indian
question, and no Indian Department."' 2 In this vision, there was no room for
Aboriginal Rights, and treaty rights were to be regarded as a vestige of the
past, not a basis for future relationships. The strength and pervasiveness of this
8 St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen, [1888] 14 A.C. 46, 2
C.N.L.C. 541 (P.C.) [St. Catherine's Milling].
R.S.C. 1927, c. 98, s. 141.
10 George R., Proclamation, 7 October 1763 (3 Geo. III), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II,
No. 1.
1 Arthur J. Ray, I Have Lived Here Since The World Began: An Illustrated History of
Canada's Native People (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1996) at 229.
12 Paul Tennant, Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British
Columbia, 1849-1989, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1990) at 92.
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ideology and its deadening impact on both the public and legal imagination is
nowhere better revealed than in a speech by Prime Minister Pierre Elliot
Trudeau in Vancouver in 1969, over 40 years after Duncan Campbell Scott's
statement, when, in defending his government's White Paper 3 which would
eliminate any separate Indian status under the Indian Act, 14 he stated:
It's inconceivable ... that in a given society one section of the society have a treaty
with the other section of the society. We must be all equal under the laws and we
must not sign treaties amongst ourselves and many of these treaties, indeed, would
have less and less significance in the future ... . I don't think that we should
encourage the Indians to feel that their treaties should last forever within Canada
.... They should become Canadians as all other Canadians .... 15
As to the claims in British Columbia to recognize and restore Aboriginal
Rights, Prime Minister Trudeau famously asserted " ... our answer - it may
not be the right one and may not be one which is accepted ... - our answer is
'no' .,1
At the time I was preparing my materials for my course in 1972, this was
the last word from the Federal government. It provided powerful
reinforcement for many in the legal profession to view my course in
Aboriginal Rights as a legal oxymoron.
The legal eclipse of Aboriginal Rights discourse was not, however, total.
Between 1927 and 1972, many issues came before the courts arising not only
from the interpretation of specific clauses of historical treaties but also
addressing the distinct legal status of Canadian Indians in the scheme of
Canadian Confederation. As a result, I discovered there were a significant
number of cases dealing with specific provisions of the Indian Act and, in
particular, the issue of the application of provincial laws to Indians and on
Indian reserves. These cases turned on the proper interpretation of section
91(24) of the BNA Act, 1867 and specific provisions of the Indian Act.
Although the concerted political efforts of Aboriginal Peoples to pursue land
claims, particularly in British Columbia, had been thwarted by the
amendments to the Indian Act, the struggle to achieve a just settlement in
British Columbia had never gone away. Aboriginal peoples in formulating
13 Canada, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Statement of the
Government of Canada on Indian Policy, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969); see Sally M.
Weaver, Making Canadian Indian Policy: The Hidden Agenda, 1969-70 (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1981).
14 Supra note 9.
15 Prime Minister Trudeau, "Remarks on Aboriginal and Treaty Rights" (speech, 8 August
1969) in Peter A. Cumming & Neil H. Mickenberg, eds., Native Rights in Canada, 2nd ed.
(Toronto: Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada, 1972] at 331.
16 Ibid. at 332.
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their own proposals for such a just settlement were anxious for knowledge of
the experience of other jurisdictions, particularly the United States where, in
the post Second World War period, the U.S. Government had established an
Indian Claims Commission with distinct heads of jurisdiction to deal with
historical claims based upon Aboriginal and treaty rights. In 1971, the same
year I assembled my course materials, an historic piece of legislation was
passed by the U.S. Congress in the form of the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act, 17 which represented in terms of money and land the largest
settlement in the history of the United States. While generous in terms of its
historical counterparts like the Indian Claims Commission process, it was
based upon the termination of any distinct Aboriginal or Indian status.
When developing a set of course materials in any other area of the law,
professors usually have the luxury of any number of leading texts that have
synthesized and expounded upon the leading cases and the relevant
legislation. While in the United States such texts existed, in Canada, the legal
eclipse of Aboriginal Rights in the Twentieth Century was sadly reflected in
the fact that until 1970 there was no textbook on Aboriginal Rights. In 1970,
the first edition of Native Rights in Canada8 was published. It was researched
and written primarily by my former colleague, Professor Doug Saunders.
Notably, one of the members of the research committee for the first edition
was Mr. Ian Binnie, now Mr. Justice Binnie of the Supreme Court of Canada,
and one of the two research associates was Professor Lysyk. The following
year, a more comprehensive second edition of Native Rights in Canada was
published under different authorship and Professor Lysyk wrote one of the
chapters on the United States Indian Claims Commission.' 9 That was my first
encounter with his writing in this field. In some twenty pages, it gave me and
my students a clear window into the history of the American experience with
Indian land claims and identified the strengths and, perhaps more importantly,
the limitations of the claims commission model based solely upon financial
compensation.
The chapter in Native Rights in Canada was not, however, Professor
Lysyk's first contribution to the modern literature on Aboriginal Rights and
Aboriginal Law. I very quickly discovered his earlier contributions as I
struggled to understand the complexities and inconsistencies of the body of
jurisprudence that dealt with the scope of federal jurisdiction under section
91(24) in relation to Indians and lands reserved for Indians and its relationship
to provincial legislative authority under section (92). In 1972 and indeed in
17 43 U.S.C. § 1601-29f(1971).
18 Indian-Eskimo Association of Canada, Native Rights in Canada (Toronto: Indian-
Eskimo Association of Canada, 1970).
19 Part VI in Cumming & Mickenberg, supra note 15 at 243.
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2004, Professor Lysyk's 1967 article in the Canadian Bar Review entitled
"The Unique Constitutional Position of the Canadian Indian" 20 was and
remains essential reading and the key text in this area of the law. This article
reveals the hallmarks of Professor Lysyk's scholarship as it later came to be
reflected in his advocacy with the Attorney General's office of Saskatchewan
and in his judgments as a Supreme Court Judge. In terms of its academic style,
post-modernist academic scholars might criticize it for being an example of
black letter legal analysis, which does not sufficiently contextualize the issues
in their social and economic frame, but from my perspective as a scholar who
never made any great claims to be either a black letter lawyer or a post-
modernist, Professor Lysyk's masterful and succinct legal analysis of the
relevant case law under section 91(24) gave me all the context that I could
handle within the framework of the principles of Canadian federalism,
including the doctrine of inter-jurisdictional immunity.2'
Professor Lysyk's 1967 article helped shape my understanding and my
lectures on the constitutional context of Aboriginal Law and for that I, and I
am sure most of my colleagues who teach First Nations and the Law, are
indebted to his scholarship.
In the modem history of Aboriginal Rights, 1973 can lay claim to being of
both ordinal and cardinal significance. The judgment of the Supreme Court of
Canada that year in Calder,22 initiated by the Nisga'a, is the first of the
modem cases on Aboriginal Rights. It re-introduced into the lexicon of the
common law the concept of Aboriginal Title, which for almost fifty years had
gone into legal eclipse. Although the Supreme Court in a four to three decision
rejected the Nisga'a appeal on a procedural technicality, all six judges that
addressed the substance of the appeal recognized that Aboriginal Title was a
pre-existing right, not dependent upon executive or legislative recognition.
The Court split three-three on the pivotal issue whether Aboriginal Title in
British Columbia had been extinguished, an issue which was only resolved by
the Supreme Court twenty-four years later in Delgamuukw.23
For today's generation of young lawyers and law students, reading the text
of a judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada is literally a click away
through electronic databases. Back in 1973, getting one's hands on the very
20 (1967) 45 Can. Bar Rev. 513 [1967 article]. For an account of the backdrop to this
article see Alan Cairns, "Kenneth Lysyk, the Hawthorn Report, and the Unique Constitutional
Position of the Canada" (2005) 38 U.B.C. L. Rev. 275.
21 For those interested in knowing what style of legal scholarship I do subscribe to, it is the
realist school best articulated by Karl Llewellyn and Oliver Wendell Holmes, which nowadays
my young colleagues don't seem much interested in but was once regarded as quite radical.
22 Calderv. British Columbia (A.G.), [1973] S.C.R. 313, 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145 [Calder].
23 Supra note 1.
VOL. 38:2
A MODEL OF SCHOLARSHIP
lengthy judgments of the Supreme Court in Calder24 required greater diligence
and the extensive legal and historical analysis contained in those judgments
did not immediately penetrate into the legal conscientiousness of most
Canadian or British Columbian lawyers. It is in this context that Professor
Lysyk's next major scholarly contribution assumes special significance. Later
in that same year as the Supreme Court's judgment in Calder was delivered,
the Canadian Bar Review published Professor Lysyk's article "The Indian
Title Question in Canada: An Appraisal in the Light of Calder". 5 In today's
legal research environment, in an internet and Quicklaw world, an article in
the Canadian Bar Review is one of many sources of legal analysis and
commentary. Back in 1973, the Canadian Bar Review occupied a larger space
in both the academic and professional arenas and Professor Lysyk's article
was the medium which communicated the important message in Calder that
Aboriginal Title was deeply woven into the fabric of Canadian Law and was
both of historical and of contemporary significance in working out a respectful
and just relationship with Aboriginal Peoples.
In his introduction to the 1973 article, Professor Lysyk reminded the reader
that "so completely had [the concept of Indian title] faded into history over the
last half century that discussion of the subject at this time must contend with a
credibility gap, an initial scepticism as to whether the concept of Indian title is
one which has any basis at all in our jurisprudence. 2 6 Professor Lysyk
reprised the conclusions of the six judges in Calder who held that Indian title
(which hereafter I will refer to as "Aboriginal Title") was not dependent upon
Crown recognition and existed both independently of the provisions of the
Royal Proclamation of 176327 and regardless of whether the Proclamation
extended to British Columbia (on which issue the Court split three-three).
Professor Lysyk went on to describe with masterful brevity the historical
pattern of Crown dealings with Aboriginal Title in Canada, outside of British
Columbia, to demonstrate that "the law did indeed take cognizance of the
existence of Indian title. '28 In re-reading these pages, I was struck by the fact
that, thirty years later, they still represent the most succinct review of the way
in which the Imperial, Colonial, and Federal Crown acknowledged the legal
reality of Aboriginal Title.
24 Supra note 22.
25 K. Lysyk, "The Indian Title Question in Canada: An Appraisal in the Light of Calder"
(1973) 51 Can. Bar Rev. 450 [1973 article].
26 Ibid. at 451.
27 Supra note 10.
28 1973 article, supra note 25 at 455.
2005
U.B.C. LAW REVIEW
In the next section of the 1973 article, Professor Lysyk presented what he
describes as a "nutshell" description of the development of colonial policy
respecting Aboriginal Title in British Columbia. 29 It, too, is as good a
summary as you will find in the literature. Although a summary, it highlights
three particularly historically significant statements: one by the Federal
Minister of Justice and the others by the Governor General of Canada. These
statements have become centerpieces in legal arguments since Calder ° to
buttress the assertion that Aboriginal Title was a pre-existing right that was
recognized by the common law at the founding of the Colony of British
Columbia and that the later policy of the Colony and the new Province after
Confederation, in not recognizing that title, was both unprincipled and
unlawful. The first statement by the then Minister of Justice Fournier marked
the first occasion upon which the federal power of disallowance of provincial
legislation was utilized. In disallowing British Columbia's first Crown Land's
Act3P' of 1874 because it did not exempt from its operation un-surrendered
Indian lands, the Minister of Justice wrote:
[T]he undersigned feels that he cannot do otherwise than advise that the Act in
question is objectionable, as tending to deal with lands which are assumed to be
the absolute property of the province, an assumption which completely ignores, as
applicable to the Indians of British Columbia, the honor and good faith with which
the Crown has, in all other cases, since its sovereignty of the territories in North
America, dealt with their various Indian tribes.32
Minister Fournier, in a passage that foreshadowed the conclusion of the
Privy Council in the St. Catherine's Milling33 case, referred to the provision of
section 109 of the BNA Act, 186734 which, in affirming Provincial ownership
of Crown lands within the Province, subjects that ownership to any interest
other than that of the Province, and the Minister advised that the un-
surrendered Indian title was such an interest.
The second statement is contained in the communication, also in 1874,
from the Governor General of Canada, Lord Dufferin, to the Secretary of State
for the Colonies wherein the Governor General wrote:
29 Ibid. at 452-67.
30 Supra note 22.
31 S.B.C. 1874, No. 2.
32 W.E. Hodgins, Correspondence, Reports of the Ministers of Justice and Orders in
Council upon the Subject of Dominion and Provincial Legislation, 1867-1895 (Ottawa:
Government Printing Bureau, 1896) at 1028, cited in 1973 article, supra note 25 at 464.
33 Supra note 8.
34 Now titled Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985,
App. II, No. 5.
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In Canada the accepted theory has been that while the sovereignty and jurisdiction
over any unsettled territory is vested in the Crown certain territorial rights or at all
events rights of occupation, hunting and pasture, are inherent in the aboriginal
inhabitants.
As a consequence the Government of Canada has never permitted any lands to be
occupied or appropriated, whether by Corporate bodies or by individuals, until
after the Indian title has been extinguished
In British Columbia this principle seems never to have been acknowledged.35
The occasion of the third statement was a speech given in Victoria by Lord
Dufferin in the course of which he stated:
Most unfortunately ... there has been an initial error ever since Sir James
[Douglas] quitted office, in the Government of British Columbia neglecting to
recognize what is known as the Indian title. In Canada this has always been done:
no Government, whether provincial or central, has failed to acknowledge that the
original title to the land existed in the Indian tribes and the communities that
hunted or wandered over them. Before we touch an acre we make a treaty with the
chiefs representing the bands we are dealing with, and having agreed upon and
paid the stipulated price ... we enter into possession, but not until then do we
consider that we are entitled to deal with a single acre."
36
At the time Professor Lysyk wrote his 1973 article,37 he was already the
Deputy Attorney General of Saskatchewan. It is a great pity that he never
became the Deputy Attorney General of British Columbia because, with the
benefit of his legal advice firmly grounded in an appreciation of the historical
record, British Columbia might not have maintained its century-old policy of
intransigence and resistance to the recognition of Aboriginal Title, and would
not have continued to advance for another twenty-five years its arguments
before the Courts the contention that Aboriginal Title was not recognized in
British Columbia.
In his 1973 article, Professor Lysyk, in addressing the nature of the Indian
title, provides the reader with an excellent clarification of the concept of the
underlying title of the Crown and its relationship to Aboriginal Title, a
concept and relationship some students find on a par with the concept of
specific intent and its relationship with mens rea, which Chief Justice Brian
Dickson once described as an "elusive cerebration in the mind. 38 Professor
35 Cited in 1973 article, supra note 25 at 466 [emphasis added].
36 Henry Milton, Speeches and Addresses of the Right Honourable Frederick Temple
Hamilton, Earl of Dufferin (London: John Murray, 1882) at 209, cited in ibid.
37 Supra note 25.
38 R. t'. Lean, (1977), 74 D.L.R. (3d) 103, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 29.
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Lysyk, in explaining the relationship between the Crown's underlying title and
Aboriginal Title, proceeds from the judicial articulation in Privy Council
decisions arising both from Canada and other former British colonies to show
how, conceptually, there is no inconsistency in locating the underlying title in
the Crown while recognizing the contemporaneous existence of Aboriginal
Title as a burden on that underlying title. He continues to argue, therefore, in
support of the position of Justice Hall in Calder39 and contrary to the position
taken by Justice Judson, that pre-confederation British Columbian colonial
ordinances (the so-called Calder 13) that stated that all lands belong in fee to
the Crown did not constitute a denial of the existence nor amount to an
implied extinguishment of Aboriginal Title. Justice Hall's and Professor
Lysyk's analyses of the law were finally affirmed by the British Columbia
Court of Appeal in Delgamuukw.4 °
Professor Lysyk again reveals his discriminating eye for significant
statements in the historical and jurisprudential record in discussing the nature
of the Crown's beneficial interest in Aboriginal Title lands. He pays particular
attention to a passage in the judgment of the Privy Council in the St.
Catherine's Millings case, where Lord Watson stated:
The fact that the power of legislating for Indians, and for lands which are reserved
to their use, has been entrusted to the Parliament of the Dominion is not in the
least degree inconsistent with the right of the Provinces to a beneficial interest in
these lands, available to them as a source of revenue whenever the estate of the
Crown is disencumbered of the Indian title.4'
Professor Lysyk then writes, "[t]he clear implication is that the beneficial
interest in the lands was not available to the province until the Indian title was
extinguished. '42 Professor Lysyk also refers to a passage from the judgment in
the 1921 Amodu Tijan143 case, another Privy Council decision, where Lord
Haldane spoke of the nature of the aboriginal beneficial interest conferred by
Aboriginal Title as capable of being " ... so complete as to reduce any radical
right in the Sovereign [the underlying title] to one which only extends to
comparatively limited rights of administrative interference."
44
39 Supra note 22.
40 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1993] 5 W.W.R. 97, 104 D.L.R. (4th) 470
(B.C.C.A.).
41 Supra note 8 at 59, cited in supra note 25 at 473 [emphasis added by Lysyk].
42 1973 article, supra note 25 at 473 [emphasis in original].
43 Amodu Tijani v. The Secretary, Southern Nigeria, [1921] 2 A.C. 399 (P.C.) [Amodu
Tijani].
44 Ibid. at 410, cited in 1973 article, supra note 25 at 475.
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The Supreme Court of Canada, in a series of cases interpreting section 35
of the Constitution Act, 198245 beginning with Sparrow,46 has developed and
expanded the concept of justifiable federal and provincial interference with
Aboriginal rights and title but has never sufficiently nor adequately explained
the conceptual fit between justifiable interference and the following principles
reflected in the Privy Council jurisprudence, all of which Professor Lysyk
identified in his 1973 article.47 Aboriginal Title, under section 109 of the BNA
Act, 186748 is an interest other than that of the Province in the lands of British
Columbia; this title constitutes a burden on the Province's underlying title;
until that title has been disencumbered by treaty or in some other way lawfully
extinguished by the Federal Crown, the Province, by virtue of its underlying
title cannot utilize Aboriginal Title lands as a source of revenue; and that
underlying title allows the Province to exercise comparatively limited rights of
administrative interference. Re-reading Professor Lysyk's 1973 article is the
clearest reminder that a cogent legal analysis based on first principles does not
lose its cogency by virtue of governmental disregard.
The last piece of Professor Lysyk's writing to which I want to refer is the
1977 Report of the Alaska Highway Pipeline Inquiry, an inquiry that he
chaired.4 9 Its mandate was to provide the Minister of Indian Affairs and
Northern Development (Jean Chrftien) with a preliminary report on the social
and economic impacts of a proposed gas pipeline through the southern Yukon.
This inquiry was convened following the Report of the MacKenzie Valley
Pipeline Inquiry that was presided over by Justice Tom Berger (as he then
was). Justice Berger took three years to complete his monumental work and I
was privileged to be part of that process as Commission Counsel for the
Community Hearings. The Alaska Highway Pipeline Inquiry was convened in
April 1977 and was given four months to complete its preliminary report.
Given the extremely short time frame, the detailed and perceptive discussion
of the issues contained in the Lysyk Report set a precedent that has rarely been
equalled.
The Lysyk Report contains a separate chapter on the Yukon Indian Land
Claim. The Yukon land claim had been tabled with the Federal Government in
a proposal entitled "Together Today for our Children Tomorrow" shortly after
45 Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
46R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 at 1092, 70 D.L.R. (4th) 385.
47 Supra note 25.
48 Supra note 34.
49 Kenneth M. Lysyk, Edith E. Bohmer & Willard L. Phelps, Alaska Highway Pipeline
Inquiry (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1977) [Lysyk Report].
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the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Calder.5° The chapter in the
Lysyk Report locates the claim in an historical and comparative perspective,
and reviews subsequent developments in negotiating the claim as well as the
main contours of the proposed settlement. Of particular importance, that
chapter sets out the nature of the prejudice that would occur to the
achievement of a just settlement of the claim if the pipeline construction began
prior to that settlement. To avoid that prejudice, the report recommended that
construction should not begin for at least another four years. In the interim the
report recommended some of the measures that could be taken to mitigate the
adverse effects of pipeline construction on the Indian land claim. This
included a proposal which would minimize the prejudice to land selection
under the settlement model while avoiding an unnecessary rigid land freeze in
the Yukon. The report suggested that its proposals constituted "a reasonable
accommodation." 5'
For someone like me, who in his early career was characterized as a radical
lawyer fighting for the civil and human rights of those who are most
marginalized in our society including Aboriginal Peoples and prisoners, the
concept of "reasonable accommodation" was not something in my vocabulary
of advocacy. However, over the years, I have come to gain much greater
respect for the concept. Aboriginal Peoples, whose cultures and economies
hinge upon accommodation and reciprocity between peoples, animals, and
their habitats, have taught me the need for balancing and accommodating
rights with responsibilities and the importance of seeking consensus as a
sustaining principle and process. Throughout his career, Professor Lysyk,
through the pen of the scholar and the voice of an advocate in the areas of
Aboriginal Law, Federalism, and most famously in his arguments in the
Patriation Reference,52 sought to forge reasonable accommodations, not on
the anvil of power or popular politics, but upon principles and processes that
provide a full measure of justice.
In many ways, Professor Lysyk's scholarship anticipated the discourse that
has been adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in its jurisprudence under
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982,53 which has sought to establish
principles to guide reconciliation of the pre-existence of Aboriginal societies
with the sovereignty of the Crown. In its decision in Delgamuukw,54 the
50 Supra note 22.
51 Lysyk Report, supra note 49 at 120.
52 Reference Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, (sub nom.
Reference Re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (Nos. 1, 2 and 3)) 125 D.L.R. (3d) 1
[Patriation Reference].
53 Supra note 45.
54 Supra note 1.
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Supreme Court articulated one of those principles as a duty to consult and
seek workable accommodations with Aboriginal Peoples as a prerequisite to
any justifiable interference with Aboriginal rights. In its most recent
judgments, the Supreme Court, in the Haida Nation55 and Taku River 6 cases,
extended the Crown's duty to consult and accommodate to asserted but
unresolved Aboriginal title and rights claims. Chief Justice McLachlin stated:
Honourable negotiation implies a duty to consult with Aboriginal claimants and
conclude an honourable agreement reflecting the claimants' inherent rights. But
proving rights may take time, sometimes a very long time. In the meantime, how
are the interests under discussion to be treated? Underlying this question is the
need to reconcile prior Aboriginal occupation of the land with the reality of Crown
sovereignty. Is the Crown, under the aegis of its asserted sovereignty, entitled to
use the resources at issue as it chooses, pending proof and resolution of the
Aboriginal claim? Or must it adjust its conduct to reflect the as yet unresolved
rights claimed by the Aboriginal claimants?
The answer, once again, lies in the honour of the Crown. The Crown, acting
honourably, cannot cavalierly run roughshod over Aboriginal interests where
claims affecting these interests are being seriously pursued in the process of treaty
negotiation and proof. It must respect these potential, but yet unproven, interests.
The Crown is not rendered impotent. It may continue to manage the resource in
question pending claims resolution. But, depending on the circumstances ... the
honour of the Crown may require it to consult with and reasonably accommodate
Aboriginal interests pending resolution of the claim. To unilaterally exploit a
claimed resource during the process of proving and resolving the Aboriginal claim
to that resource, may be to deprive the Aboriginal claimants of some or all of the
benefit of the resource. That is not honourable.f
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Spurred by the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, a new discourse and practice,
framed along the axis of accommodation, is developing as a necessary part of
working out the relationship between First Nations and the Crown.
The discourse and practice of accommodation was given voice by
Professor Ken Lysyk twenty-five years ago, and as with so much of the work
of this elegant jurist, it provides a contemporary model of scholarship in the
service of justice.
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